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Our paper investigates how Voivodina, a region with multicultural traditions, 
organises the institutional means for cultures living together – an issue that is rarely 
without its characteristic confrontations.3 Our subject matter is the innovative Serbian 
institution of personal autonomy, known as the system of national minority councils: 
how do they facilitate the self-determination of cultural communities living next to 
each other for centuries, and what perspectives are there for Serbia in this regard, 
especially in the context of EU-integration.
1  His research was supported by the National Scientific and Investigational Fund (Országos 
Tudományos és Kutatási Alap) application number: PD 76004.
2  This research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, co-financed 
by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP 4.2.4. A/2-11-1-2012-0001 
‘National Excellence Program’.
3  This is the case of Western (supposedly luckier) democracies as well, as it is clear, for 
example, from the volume Multikulturelle Gesellschaft und Demokratie, J. MARKO – G. R. 
BURKERT-DOTTOLO (ed.), Berlin 2000.
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Encounter of Cultures in the Region
Though the situation of minorities has appeared from time to time in democracy 
discourses, it was never part of their mainstream. Why has the discourse of 
disenfranchised minorities remained largely ineffective? Though the problem is far 
from marginal, a more historically-minded analysis should address this particular 
issue. However, the traditional minority discourse, based on a policy of past wrongs 
and offences, does not seem to be suitable for/compatible with the minority political 
methods that the EU offers. If the EU and its aspirants can understand the “democracy 
deficit” stemming from the minority situation, then there seems to be some chance to 
Europe-ise minority issues.
Though a lot more homogeneous than in the era of “regional unification”, 
it is one of the most complex ethno-political systems of Europe. Due to economic 
globalisation and the presence of its supra-national institution system, “traditional 
methods” would not solve the challenges of the West-Balkan. Wars (nowadays 
“low-intensity armed conflicts”) and ethnic homogenisation along twentieth-century 
modernisation programs4 are now excluded from the repertoire of post-Yugoslavian 
states, which are largely subject to the intentions of international organisations.
The issue of minorities (social large groups of a non-dominant situation) was 
highlighted again by the transitions of the post-socialist region during the end of the 
last century. According to Joseph Marko, processes of regional disintegration and 
national/supranational integration were occurring synchronously during the 90᾿s.5 
From the viewpoint of Western democracies, minority situation was articulated as 
a security-political concern. This is one of the reasons that in the prerequisites of 
supranational integration, even if not de jure but de facto, a very serious aspect is 
the aspirant countries᾿ attitude toward the political situation of their non-dominant 
communities.6 Yet, this is not the same as the recognition of the minority political 
4  L. GULYÁS, Két régió – Felvidék és Vajdaság – sorsa az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchiától 
napjainkig, Budapest 2005, pp. 23–40
5  J. MARKO, Autonomie und Integration. Rechtsinstitute des Nationalitätenrechts im 
funktionalen Vergleich, Wien, Köln, Graz 1994, pp. 17–25.
6  E. LANTSCHNER – J. MARKO – A. PETRICUSIC (ed.), European Integration and its 
Effects on Minority Protection in South Eastern Europe, Berlin 2008.
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challenge. It is still not clear to what extent are the novel institutions useful for minority 
members for maintaining identity and/or for demonstrating the self-conscience of 
political communities.7 We believe that the political tool presented here can be an 
example for the entire EU, even if it generates conflicts during its actual realisation – 
both between the coexisting cultural large groups and within them.
The Institutions of National Minority Councils in Serbia – The role of 
Policy-makings
As institutions of policy making, national minority councils were formed only recently 
(around 2003). Thus, before any analysis, it is feasible to set the institution system 
itself in the given economic situation and discuss its role in society. In the autumn of 
2000, Koštunica inflicted such a great defeat on Milošević that there was no use face-
lifting the results and forcing the challenger into a second round. However, the new 
elite was not able/willing to fulfil entirely the increased social expectations, either. 
To mark this, the expression “the 6th October” came into general use in reflections on 
politics as the symbol of unfulfilled expectations and unperformed reforms.
Afterwards, the preparations for a legal settling of the minority situation that 
is satisfying for the majority of the concerned8 also started. One of the first steps was 
the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Freedoms adopted by Serbia 
and Montenegro. This was adopted by the Council of Citizens (Federal Assembly 
of Serbia and Montenegro) on 28th February 2003, and was ratified by The National 
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on the session of 26th February. In this charter the 
fundamental rights were listed which were considered normative by the state union, 
including several relating to the situation of minorities. In that particular constitutional 
situation this was the highest forum where such things could be declared.
The draft of the minority act was prepared. When analysing it in detail, 
Miodrag a. Jovanović discovered the followings: First of all, the draft uses the term 
national minority as a collective term for minorities in different situations and of 
different origins in order to be able to regulate their situation in one, although their 
7  E. LANTSCHNER – S. CONSTANTIN – J. MARKO (ed.), Practice of Minority Protection 
in Central Europe, Berlin 2011.
8  The Albanians of Kosovo could not be included in this process.
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situations are sociologically different. The draft itself is highly liberal and has great 
significance beyond the basic principles in international expectations. According to 
its authors, this legal act not only accomplishes the constitutional rights of minorities 
but also greatly contributes to their political integration into Serbian society. The 
first two articles of the draft consisting of 6 sections and 25 articles, include the 
general regulations on minorities. Jovanović states that despite the fact that collective 
rights are mentioned already in the first article, the draft – considering its character – 
rather concentrates on the elaboration of individual rights. He welcomes the fact that 
the draft, contrary to the general political trend, attempts to provide a definition for 
minority. It includes such basic principles as: (1) being attached to the territory of the 
state for a long period of time; (2) specific characteristics that distinguish the minority 
from the majority; and (3) solidarity within the community. These principles are 
treated in great detail, so the aspects of language and religion are also included in the 
definition. Furthermore, it proposes a large range of future changes.9 Social groups 
that, due to their cultural heritage or historical origin, want to define themselves in the 
future as minorities, may expect a favourable judgement.10
However, it was only at the end of the decade when a law to define the “way of 
exercise” of the aforementioned rights came to be. (According to the new legislation, 
minority communities of the meanwhile (2006) disintegrated Serbian confederacy 
could elect their national minority councils first on June 6, 2010).
The Serbian Practice of Minority Politics – Party Political Background of the 
Events
Right after the elections, the status quo seemed to remain unchanged. However, in the 
coalition the socialist party gained relevance again, due to its instrumental position. 
From a minor coalition factor, the Serbian Socialist Party became a kingmaker. The 
9  Here we would like to draw the attention to the fact that minority-sation is not a completed 
process: through the shifting of big political groups new primary majorities and, therefore, 
new minorities may emerge.
10  We also consider this as an important development, which breaks the habit of listing 
minorities in so-called residual (doomed to evanescence) categories, and handles them as 
communities which are still able to rise from society.
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new leaders of the party once dominant in the Milosević-era made their move to 
reclaim the legitimacy of their own political role. As a first step of this, they formed 
government coalition with the nationalists instead of the democrats. (Reminder: this 
had the precondition that DP candidate Boris Tadić had been defeated by nationalist 
Tomislav Nikolić – which, in turn, had largely been facilitated by minority voters 
who become passive by the second round of elections). After consolidating his power 
position, head of state Ivica Dačić (delegated by the smaller party) decided it was 
time for an “Euro-Atlantic” acceptance of his party and himself. The basis for this 
was a pragmatic approach to the Kosovo-problem which had previously seemed 
unresolvable. By the spring of 2013, a solution was found that was acceptable for 
Albanian and international mediators (protectors) as well.
These recent Kosovo-related events have turned public attention toward 
minority issues again, including many results that can be regarded positive from 
numerous viewpoints. Most of these aim at a “normalization” of the Serbia-Kosovo 
relations and a decrease of tensions. On the level of diplomacy, there is a shift from 
the symbolic action field toward a pragmatic one. However, it is yet unknown if 
this is merely the outward communication of the main actors representing the state 
(president, head of state). Is it just a revaluation of the situation, or an actual (half-)
turn that is meant to be accepted by society as well?
Even after the elite change of the Serbian minority institution systems in 2000 
October, a well perceivable main tendency remained. It has been striving to shape 
new institutional opportunities so that they could not endanger certain relations that 
are regarded as a basic Serb national interest: so that “they could not become nests 
of ‘newer᾿ secessionist efforts”.
As compared to its past incarnations, minority question were re-
contextualized in the last decade of the 20th century by the intensity of conflicts 
that emerged despite the linguistic and cultural similarity of the so-called 
Yugoslavian core regions. In fact, this might (should) bring about certain revisions 
regarding the so far maintained values and goals concerning inter-community 
(multicultural) relations. In the whole area known as West-Balkan, political 
public thought has not yet grasped the importance of minority inequities that are 
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constantly re-created on a political basis and that are taken for granted even today: 
structural disadvantages that originated from the minority position. To a large 
extent, Serbian political efforts are defined by relations to this minority anomaly. 
These relations have been constantly revised throughout the last twenty years, 
being strongly influenced by international (external), regional (meaning the post-
Yugoslavian region) and local (internal) characteristics. Serbia have produced 
much differing minority political “solutions” that could be diagonally opposed 
to each other. The list goes from genocide attempt through forced expulsion to 
the constitutionally guaranteed and legally ensured introduction of personally 
principled autonomy institution systems.
The European Committee and the MSI
It was a recent news of minority politics that the European civil initiative of 
minority protection by the FUEN (Federative Union of European Nationalities) 
and the RMDSZ was rejected by the European Commission. Making use of this 
relatively recent (2012 April) EU-institution, the initiators wished to use a petition 
for obliging the European Council to regulate the issue with the document 
Minority Safepack Initiative (MSI).11 So far it has been stated that the European 
Commission is not competent in many elements of the document’s contents. The 
initiators included six areas to be addressed by the MSI: language, educational/
cultural, regional politics, presence of minorities in the EP, anti-discrimination, 
media regulation/support policies.
If one knows a little about the history of European minority initiatives, it is 
known that there has been much greater resistance to such (previously appearing only 
on the level of nation-states) efforts. In spite of all this, there is a well-functioning 
autonomy in South Tirol. Germans in Belgium have their own parliament and its 
competences (though their numbers can’t be more than that of non-Serbians in 
Voivodina). And we didn’t mention nations (and their efforts) fragmented into several 
countries and/or once having had their own autonomous states, like Catalans or Scots. 
11 https://www.fuen.org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/MSPI_ENGL_Official_
Document.pdf.
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None should be fooled by the fact that this is the third initiative that bounces off the 
acute lack of competence on the part of the EC. It will be a “long round”, and the 
turn won’t come for free, much must be done, much and in a consequent way. (See 
the interview with Salat Levente on Transindex: “Hosszú menet lesz” “It’ll be a long 
round”12 (http://itthon.transindex.ro/?cikk=21289). The last action about the issue 
was the “great march” organised by the National Minority Council of the Szekelys, 
on October 27, 2013. Likewise, the Catalan living chain also intended to enforce 
competences in minority issues.
European Council Standpoints about the Institution Formations on the 
Periphery of Europe
It was only recently that Swiss social-democrat politician and EC representative 
Andreas Gross, held a lecture in Budapest. He is the author of the 2003 report. In the 
Gross-report autonomy was presented to the EC as an institutional solution assisting 
the development of democracy.
Excerpts from the Gross-report:
5. The vast majority of European states today include communities which have 
different identities. Some of these demand their own institutions, and special laws 
allowing them to express their distinctive cultures. (our highlights – SCSM-PT).
6. States must prevent tensions from developing by introducing flexible constitutional 
or legislative arrangements to meet minorities’ expectations. By giving minorities 
powers of their own, either devolved or shared with central government, states can 
sometimes reconcile the principle of territorial unity and integrity with the principle 
of cultural diversity.
15. Autonomy is not a panacea, and the solutions it offers are not universally relevant 
and applicable.  However, failure should be blamed not on autonomy as such, but on 
12  In Hungarian, the word menet can mean both “round” and “march”.
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the conditions in which it is applied.  Autonomous status must always be tailored to 
the geography, history and culture of the area concerned, and to the very different 
characteristics of specific cases and conflict zones.
17. Successful autonomy depends on balanced relationships within a state between 
majorities and minorities, but also between minorities themselves. Autonomous 
status must always respect the principles of equality and non-discrimination, and be 
based on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states.
18. It is of great importance that the increasing benefits which autonomous entities 
gain from their rights do not undermine the internationally recognised borders 
of states. (Resolution 1334; http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/
AdoptedText/ta03/ERES1334.htm)
After the 2003 report, the European Council addressed the issue again in 2011. The 
EC resolution 183213 has the following relevant notions:
7. The Assembly considers that even if international law were to recognise a right 
of national or ethnic minorities or even, in some cases, national majorities to self-
determination, such a right would not give rise to an automatic right to secession. 
The right to self-determination should first and foremost be implemented by way 
of the protection of minority rights as foreseen in the Council of Europe Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157) and Assembly 
Resolution 1334 (2003) on positive experiences of autonomous regions as a source of 
inspiration for conflict resolution in Europe, as well as in other relevant instruments 
of international law.
8. The Assembly therefore:
8.1. reiterates its invitation to those member states which have not yet done so to sign, 
ratify and implement the Framework Convention and to respect the basic principles 
set out in Assembly Resolution 1334 (2003) as soon as possible;
13  http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=18024&lang=en.
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8.2. will continue to analyse the origin and trends of self-determination movements 
by addressing the most salient factors, in particular instances of growing tensions 
among minority or ethnic groups, and to support national parliaments in addressing 
these demands for self-determination through dialogue and reconciliation, in order 
to prevent recourse to violence and secession.
Chances of Autonomy in Serbia
As the cited documents also note,14 autonomy is not a miraculous panacea, but it 
is well-applicable within the framework of majority-principled decision making, 
a regular solution mode for the dignity-oriented self-determination efforts of minority 
communities. nation states are, for the time being, able to utilize a strategy of 
postponing, since those communities that cannot achieve a bottom-up autonomy can 
only rely on the alternative (namely: international) pressure from outside, if there are 
already actual and ongoing conflicts between minority communities and the region’s 
majority society. The coexistence of cultures is at stake in Serbia.
In almost each of the new democracies, there is a political insubordination 
present that is theoretically unacceptable by European norms. The regionally 
principled refusing (not granting) decision-making competences is an attempt to 
conserve this insubordination. The question is, in Serbia as well, whether attention 
can be drawn to the issue through symbolic political actions.
Today, only the preparedness and readiness of those involved and the democratic 
commitment of decision-makers determine when/whether minority politics are 
included in explicit EU policies or when or whether complete and efficient minority 
institutions appear in the Copenhagen criteria. Serbia is not in a disadvantageous 
situation here, as it does have certain exemplary institutional solutions – exemplary 
for not only the other aspirant countries, but for the entire EU. Then again, there are 
certain issues that are harder to be processed by the majority society. Such issue is 
the ethnically-based regional autonomy, and it is inevitable and required that Serbia 
should establish institutions and procedures based expectations of the European 
Council and the EU.
14  C.f. The 15 paragraph of the Gross-report.
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Abstract
Our presentation investigates how Voivodina organizes the institutional means for 
cultures to live together. Our subject matter is the innovative Serbian method of personal 
autonomy: the system of national minority councils, ensuring the self-organization 
of cultural communities. We discuss how are NMCs useful for community members 
to retain their identity and how are they able to present a given collective identity. 
NMCs are exemplary even for the entire EU, though they also generate new conflicts 
between (and within) neighbouring cultural groups. We emphasise this because 
the European civil initiative of minority protection by FUEN (Federative Union of 
European Nationalities) was rejected by the European Commission. Making use of this 
relatively recent EU-institution, the initiators wished to oblige the European Council 
to regulate the issue with the document Minority Safepack Initiative (MSI). The MSI 
has six areas to regulate: language, educational/cultural, regional politics, presence 
of minorities in the EP, anti-discrimination, media regulation/support politics. The 
EU does have its language policy and (a not too efficient) regional policy. But there 
is not explicit policy to address community or personal identities. Serbia, only an 
applicant yet, is attempting to form specific institution (based on its own cultural 
variety and past), and could also serve as an example for European member countries 
as well, including those who will judge Serbia’s democratic maturity by the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria.
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